Unsigned X.509 Certificates

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

An X.509 certificate [RFC5280] relates two entities in the PKI: information about a subject and a proof from an issuer. Some applications, however, only require subject information. For example, an X.509 trust anchor is described by information about the subject (a root certification authority, or root CA). The relying party trusts this information out-of-band and does not require an issuer's signature.¶

X.509 does not define such a structure. Instead, X.509 trust anchors often use "self-signed" certificates, where the CA's key is used to sign the certificate. Other formats, such as [RFC5914] exist to convey trust anchors, but self-signed certificates remain widely used. Additionally, some TLS [RFC8446] server deployments use self-signed certificates when they do not intend to present a CA-issued identity, instead expecting the relying party to authenticate the certificate out-of-band, e.g. via a known fingerprint.¶

These self-signatures typically have no security value, aren't checked by the receiver, and only serve as placeholders to meet syntactic requirements of an X.509 certificate.¶

Computing signatures as placeholders has some drawbacks:¶

• Post-quantum signature algorithms are large, so including a self-signature significantly increases the size of the payload.¶

• If the subject is an end entity, rather than a CA, computing an X.509 signature risks cross-protocol attacks with the intended use of the key.¶

• It is ambiguous whether such a self-signature requires the CA bit in basic constraints or keyCertSign in key usage. If the key is intended for a non-X.509 use, asserting those capabilities is an unnecessary risk.¶

• If end entity's key is not a signing key (e.g. a KEM key), there is no valid signature algorithm to use with the key.¶

This document defines a profile for unsigned X.509 certificates, which may be used when the certificate is used as a container for subject information, without any specific issuer.¶

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

3. Constructing Unsigned Certificates

This document defines how to use the id-alg-noSignature OID from Appendix C.1 of [RFC5272] with X.509 certificates.¶

  id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }

  id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}

To construct an unsigned X.509 certificate, the sender MUST set the Certificate's signatureAlgorithm and TBSCertificate's signature fields each to an AlgorithmIdentifier with algorithm id-alg-noSignature. The parameters for id-alg-noSignature MUST be present and MUST be encoded as NULL. The Certificate's signatureValue field MUST be a BIT STRING of length zero.¶

4. Consuming Unsigned Certificates

X.509 signatures of type id-alg-noSignature are always invalid. This contrasts with [JWT]. When processing X.509 certificates without verifying signatures, receivers MAY accept id-alg-noSignature. When verifying X.509 signatures, receivers MUST reject id-alg-noSignature. In particular, X.509 validators MUST NOT accept id-alg-noSignature in the place of a signature in the certification path.¶

X.509 applications must already account for unknown signature algorithms, so applications are RECOMMENDED to satisfy these requirements by ignoring this document. An unmodified X.509 validator will not recognize id-alg-noSignature and is thus already expected to reject it in the certification path. Conversely, in contexts where an X.509 application was ignoring the self-signature, id-alg-noSignature will also be ignored, but more efficiently.¶

5. Security Considerations

If an application uses a self-signature when constructing a subject-only certificate for a non-X.509 key, the X.509 signature payload and those of the key's intended use may collide. The self-signature might then be used as part of a cross-protocol attack. Using id-alg-noSignature avoids a single key being used for both X.509 and the end-entity protocol, eliminating this risk.¶

If an application accepts id-alg-noSignature as part of a certification path, or in any other context where it is necessary to verify the X.509 signature, the signature check would be bypassed. Thus, Section 4 prohibits this and recommends that applications not treat id-alg-noSignature differently from any other previously unrecognized signature algorithm. Non-compliant applications that instead accept id-alg-noSignature as a valid signature risk of vulnerabilities analogous to [JWT].¶

6. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.¶

7. References

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Bob Beck, Nick Harper, and Sophie Schmieg for reviewing an early iteration of this document. Thanks to Alex Gaynor for providing a link to cite for [JWT]. Thanks to Russ Housley for pointing out that id-alg-noSignature was already defined in [RFC5272].¶

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